1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
U.S. Department of State, February 25, 2000
PAKISTAN
For most of the year, Pakistan was an Islamic republic with a democratic political system; however, on October 12, the
elected civilian government of Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif was overthrown in a bloodless coup led by Army Chief
of Staff General Pervez Musharraf. General Musharraf, in consultation with senior military commanders, designated
himself Chief Executive, and suspended the Constitution, the National Assembly, the Senate, and the provincial assemblies.
The office of the President, which is mainly ceremonial, was retained. General Musharraf appointed an advisory National
Security Council, which included both military and civilian advisers, and a civilian cabinet. The government bureaucracy
continued to function; however, at all levels, the functioning of the Government after the coup was "monitored" by military
commanders. Prior to the coup, the Prime Minister, selected by a majority within a popularly elected Parliament, had wide
constitutional power. The Pakistan Muslim League (PML) Government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, which came to
power in February 1997 with a two-thirds Parliamentary majority, passed constitutional amendments (the 13th and 14th) in
1998, which enhanced the power of the Prime Minister by removing the power of the President to dismiss the Government
at his discretion and banning defections from political parties, two of the most frequently used methods of bringing down
previous governments. These measures, which enjoyed opposition support, were aimed at enhancing political stability at the
national level. As a result of these changes, the Sharif Government had greater power than any of its predecessors since the
return of formal democracy in 1988. However, the military continued to exercise considerable influence over
decision-making. The power of the Government was further enhanced by a 1997 constitutional confrontation between the
Prime Minister and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court over the selection of five new justices for the Court. As a result
of this struggle, the former President resigned in December 1997, and the Prime Minister's candidate was elected by the
Parliament to the presidency. That same month, a Supreme Court panel deprived the Chief Justice of his position and a new
Chief Justice was sworn in. Some observers feared that this confrontation damaged the prestige and independence of the
judiciary. The Constitution provided for an independent judiciary; however, it was subject to executive branch influence.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court demonstrated a continued degree of independence on a number of occasions prior to the
coup. Corruption and inefficiency are problems in all branches.
Responsibility for internal security rests primarily with the police, although paramilitary forces, such as the Rangers and
Frontier Constabulary, provide support in areas where law and order problems are acute, such as Karachi and the frontier
areas. Provincial governments control the police and paramilitary forces when they are assisting in law and order
operations. The regular army also occasionally is deployed to assist in maintaining public order in sensitive areas during
certain religious holidays. After the coup, the army played a role in enforcing exit control restrictions at airports and border
crossings as part of the Musharraf regime's accountability efforts. Members of the security forces committed numerous
serious human rights abuses.
Pakistan is a poor country, with great extremes in the distribution of wealth. Its per capita annual income is $490. The
overall illiteracy rate is 62 percent, and is even higher for women. Cotton, textiles and apparel, rice, and leather products are
the principal exports. The economy includes both state-run and private industries and financial institutions. The
Constitution provides for the right of private businesses to operate freely in most sectors of the economy. The Government
has made several economic reforms, including privatizing state-owned enterprises and reducing tariffs. Politically driven
confrontations with Independent Power Projects (IPPS) and the Government's inability to repay investors in hard currency
have damaged investor confidence and hampered privatization.
The Government's poor human rights record deteriorated under the Sharif Government, and there were serious problems in
several areas; however, the situation worsened with the seizure of power by General Musharraf, in that after the coup,
citizens no longer had the right to change their government peacefully. Despite attempts to reform and to professionalize the
police, both before and after the coup police committed numerous extrajudicial killings and tortured, abused, and raped
citizens. While the officers responsible for such abuses sometimes were transferred or suspended for their actions, there is
no evidence that any police officers were brought to justice. In general, police continued to commit serious abuses with
impunity. Prison conditions remained poor, and police arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens. In Karachi killings between
rival political factions often were carried out with the assistance of criminal gangs; however, many such killings also were
believed to have been committed by or with the participation of security forces. The Sharif Government used the
"accountability" process--which supposedly was designed to expose previous wrongdoing, recoup ill-gotten gains, and
restore public confidence in government institutions--for political purposes by harassing and arresting a number of
prominent politicians and bureaucrats connected with the main opposition party. Few of those arrested and questioned were
put on trial; however, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and her husband were convicted on corruption charges in
April. Bhutto was sentenced to 5 years in prison, disqualified from holding public office, and fined. The Musharraf regime
used arbitrary detention, including incommunicado detention, against political figures from the Sharif Government and their
families; and the Musharraf regime's in the Musharraf regimes' anti-corruption campaign violated due process. Case
backlogs under both Governments led to long delays in trials, and lengthy pretrial detention is common. The judiciary is
subject to executive and other outside influence, and suffers from inadequate resources, inefficiency, and corruption.
Despite concerns about damage to the judiciary due to the December 1997 confrontation between the Prime Minister and
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, there were instances prior to the coup in which the Supreme Court showed a
continued degree of independence. While in February 1998 the Sharif Government ceased using military courts to try
certain civilian cases at the demand of the Supreme Court, special antiterrorism courts expanded their jurisdiction to include
murder, gang rape, child molestation, and "illegal" strikes. These courts are authorized to try terrorists swiftly, and those
convicted may appeal only to a higher military court. In October 1998, the National Assembly voted for a 15th
constitutional amendment, which would oblige the Government to enforce Shari'a (Islamic law). However, the Senate did
not vote on the measure before it was suspended by the Musharraf regime in October. Both the Sharif Government and the
Musharraf Government infringed on citizen's privacy rights. Although the press continued to publish relatively freely, the
Sharif Government used its large advertising budget to influence content, journalists practiced self-censorship, the broadcast
media remain a closely controlled government monopoly, and the Sharif Government made several attempts to curb press
criticism. In particular, the Sharif Government continued its actions against the Jang newspaper group and jailed and
harassed prominent journalists such as Friday Times editor Najam Sethi. The Musharraf regime appeared to cease direct
attempts to manage the press, which were common under the Sharif Government. The Sharif Government imposed limits
on the freedom of assembly. Although it allowed a number of large-scale, antigovernment demonstrations to take place, it
also prevented demonstrations and strikes and arrested organizers when it believed that security was threatened, particularly
in advance of the September 4 strike called by general traders and sponsored by opposition parties. The Sharif Government
limited freedom of association, and targeted the activities of nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), revoking the licenses
of almost 2,000 NGO's in Punjab. Both Governments imposed limits on freedom of religion, particularly for Ahmadis.
Three Ahmadis sentenced in 1997 to life in prison for blasphemy remain incarcerated. Both Governments imposed limits
on freedom of movement. Governor's Rule continued in Sindh province until the coup, under which its citizens continued to
be denied democratic representation at the provincial level. The Prime Minister in June appointed an Advisor for Sindh
Affairs, who exercised executive authority in the province without a popular mandate. After the coup, Sindh shared the same
status as the other provinces; assemblies in the other provinces were suspended and General Musharraf appointed
governors for all four provinces. The Musharraf Government spoke out against some of the human rights abuses of the
previous regime and appointed NGO representatives to a number of senior positions, but it was not clear at year's end
whether the Musharraf regime would take concrete steps to address such problems.
Significant numbers of women were subjected to violence, abuse, rape, trafficking, and other forms of degradation by their
spouses and members of society at large. The Government failed to take action in a high profile "honor killing" case and
such killings continued throughout the country. There was considerable discrimination against women, and traditional
social and legal constraints kept women in a subordinate position in society. Violence against children, as well as child
abuse, prostitution, and trafficking remained problems. Female children still lag far behind boys in education, health care,
and other social benefits. There was considerable discrimination against religious minorities. Both Governments as well as
sectarian groups continued to discriminate against religious minorities, particularly Ahmadis and Christians. Religious and
ethnic-based rivalries resulted in numerous killings and civil disturbances. The Government and employers continued to
restrict worker rights significantly. Bonded labor by both adults and children remained a problem. Debt slavery persisted.
The use of child labor remained widespread, although it now generally is recognized as a serious problem, and industrial
exporters have adopted a number of measures to eliminate child labor from specific sectors. Mob violence and terrorist
attacks remained problems.
In May heavy fighting broke out between Indian forces and Kashmiri militants in the Kargil sector of Indian-held Kashmir,
and continued until July. Regular Pakistani forces were also involved in the conflict. Civilians were killed on both sides of
the line of control during the conflict, and tens of thousands of persons were displaced on both sides of the line of control.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Police committed extrajudicial killings. The extrajudicial killing of criminal suspects, often in the form of deaths in police
custody or staged encounters in which police shoot and kill the suspects, is common. Police officials generally insist that
these deaths occur during attempts at escape or at resisting arrest; family members and the press insist that many of these
deaths are staged. Police have been known to kill suspected criminals to prevent them from implicating police in crimes
during court proceedings. After an attempt was made on the Prime Minister's life in early January, as many as 40 Sunni
extremists associated with the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, the group believed responsible, may have been killed in police encounters.
The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) estimates that there were 161 extrajudicial killings in the first 4
months of the year. In March the Sindh Home Department conceded that at least two incidents since imposition of
Governor's Rule resulted in extrajudicial deaths. Press reports note that in Punjab alone 265 individuals were killed in 182
encounters with police between January and June. The Urdu daily newspaper Khabrain reported on December 6 that there
were 285 police encounters in Punjab in the first 10 months of the year and that 357 persons lost their lives. In October
there were reports of police encounter killings of members of the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and the
Lashkar-i-Jhangvi by the police in Punjab, following a wave of sectarian violence in the province (see Section 2.c.).
Estimates of SSP and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi members killed by police in this manner range from 16 to 40 persons. Police
officials maintain in private that due to the lack of concrete evidence, witness intimidation, corruption in and threats against
the judiciary, and sometimes political pressure, courts often fail to punish criminals involved in serious crimes. Police
professionalism is low. The police view the killings of criminal suspects as appropriate given the lack of effective action by
the judiciary against criminals. The judiciary, on the other hand, faults the police for presenting weak cases that do not stand
up in court.
Police officers occasionally are transferred or briefly suspended for their involvement in extrajudicial killings. However,
court-ordered inquiries into these killings so far have failed to result in any police officer receiving criminal punishment.
Punjabi police killed Tahir Prince on February 10. Following the filing of a writ by the victim's mother, the Lahore High
Court ordered registration of a case against the police officers involved; however, no departmental action has been taken. In
general police continued to commit such killings with impunity.
Following the coup in October, a number of police officials were charged or sanctioned for extrajudicial killings. On
December 2, the Lahore High Court ordered the registration of cases against the Deputy Inspector General (DIG) of Police
Sarghoda Range and six other police officers in the April 5 killing of two Sarghoda residents. The residents reportedly
were mistaken for a Lashkar-i-Jhangvi member and killed in a police encounter. On December 7, the Punjab Chief
Secretary announced that three senior Lahore-based police officials would be removed following the killing of a suspect in
police custody. The suspect was charged in connection with a series of killings of children in Lahore. One police
sub-inspector was sentenced to death during the year in the 1997 killing of Iraqi Noel, whom the police officer had taken
into custody.
The police and security forces were responsible for the deaths of a number of individuals associated with political or
terrorist groups. For example, Punjab police officers killed activists of the extremist sectarian organization
Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, which was implicated in an attempt to kill the Prime Minister in January. During the year, three
individuals charged with attempting to assassinate the Prime Minister in January were killed in police custody during an
alleged escape attempt. As of August, 21 activists from this organization were killed in police encounters, according to press
accounts and the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan.
The Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM), an opposition party that has demonstrated a willingness to use violence to
further its objectives, claimed that its adherents were being targeted specifically by the police for extrajudicial killings. The
MQM was formed by Altaf Hussein in 1984 as a student movement to further the rights of Mohajirs, the descendants of
Urdu-speaking Muslims who migrated from India to Pakistan following partition in 1947. It soon became an organization
with criminal elements, which generated income through extortion and other forms of racketeering. The MQM presently is
split between the original MQM, formerly known as the Mohajir Quami Movement, and headed by Altaf Hussain
(MQM-Altaf), a large breakaway group (MQM-Haqiqi), and other, smaller factions. The MQM-Altaf, in part because of its
efficient organization and willingness to use violence and intimidation to achieve its goals, became the dominant political
party in the Sindh urban centers of Karachi and Hyderabad. The MQM, despite a number of moderate and nonviolent
leaders now in the Senate, National Assembly, and Sindh Provincial Assembly, has not been able to separate itself from its
violent past. As a result, it has antagonized followers, suffered violent breakaways, and continually been at odds with
successive governments. In March MQM Senator Aftab Sheikh accused the Sindh police, the paramilitary Rangers, and
Government intelligence agencies of abducting two MQM members--Farid and Shamim--and killing them in custody; the
two reportedly were handcuffed when killed. In July London-based MQM chief Altaf Hussain accused the Karachi police
of killing Mohammed Shahid after his arrest. Altaf Hussain also claimed in July that 14 MQM workers were killed
extrajudicially since the imposition of Governor's Rule. In a July report, the MQM listed 10 persons, mostly MQM
activists, killed in extrajudicial incidents by Karachi police between October 1998 and March. In September MQM activist
Rehan Bandhani died in police custody. According to the daily newspaper The News, the police initially argued that
Bandhani had died of a heart attack, but a police officer later was charged with unintentional murder. On September 7, two
MQM activists were killed in an encounter with police; police officials stated that the two men shot first, but witnesses claim
that the two were taken, unarmed, from their homes and shot by police in a nearby field.
In NWFP the family of a notorious criminal known as "Shaitan" accused police of killing him in custody on May 9. The
NWFP government has taken no action; however, the government of the NWFP set up a committee of inquiry to look into
the death of Pakistan Muslim League youth wing leader Qasim Khan, who died while in custody of the Peshawar police on
July 18. In 1998, Awais Akram, Arbab Yousah, and Abbas died while in police custody; in all three cases police officers
were charged in connection with the deaths, but no information was available as the disposition of the cases at year's end.
Ghulam Jillani, a 14-year-old boy, died while in police custody in Manshera in May 1998. Then NWFP Chief Minister
Sardar Mehtab Ahmed Khan dismissed the entire staff of the police station involved. The Abbottabad session judge led a
committee of inquiry that investigated the incident; the committee held the Station House Officer and the staff of the police
station responsible for Jillani's death. At year's end, the officers involved were appealing the decision.
The Sharif Government also used lethal force against political opponents and underground organizations.
Politically motivated violence and sectarian violence continued to be a problem, although in the weeks following the October
12 coup there were few if any reported cases of such violence. Governor's Rule, imposed to correct a serious law and order
problem created in part by political tensions in the province, continued in Sindh until the coup. Despite improved security
conditions under Governor's Rule, there were 75 deaths that were presumed to be the result of political violence in Karachi.
Terrorist incidents were frequent in the Punjab. On January 3, four persons were killed and several were injured when a
bomb placed under a bridge outside of Lahore exploded. The bombing occurred approximately 1 hour before Prime
Minister Sharif was to have crossed the bridge, and was believed to be an assassination attempt. Two members of the
Lashkar-i-Jhangvi extremist group were arrested in connection with the blast later that month. According to press reports,
on May 24, at least 10 persons were reportedly killed by an explosion near a market in Daska, Punjab. There were several
other bombings during the year, some of which resulted in deaths. The perpetrators of most such bombings were unknown
at year's end. In 1998, there were several bombings in which persons were killed. At year's end, it was not known who
carried out these bombings.
Women were killed by family members in so-called "honor killings." On April 6, Samia Imran, who sought a divorce
against the wishes of her husband and family, was shot and killed in the Lahore office of lawyer Hina Jilani by a man
accompanying her mother. The gunman and the victim's mother fled after the killing. The gunman later was shot and killed
by police. Three members of Imran's family--her father, mother, and uncle--were charged in connection with her killing.
However, by year's end, the three remained at large (see Section 5.).
There was extensive religious violence, particularly between rival Sunni and Shi'a organizations, with 1 newspaper
estimating that 300 persons were killed in sectarian attacks during the last 2 years (see Sections 2.c. and 5).
On January 12, in Peshawar, the wife and son of well-known Afghan moderate Abdul Haq were shot and killed in their
sleep by unknown assailants. A guard also was killed in the attack. Haq was well known for his efforts to promote an
intra-Afghan dialog; his brother was a former governor in Afghanistan who has joined forces with Ahmad Shah Masood
against the Taliban. On March 27, Mohammed Jehanzeb, the secretary of Abdul Haq's brother (and Taliban opponent) Haji
Qadir, was shot and killed by unknown assailants in Peshawar. On July 14 former Afghan senator Abdul Ahad Karzai was
shot and killed by two gunmen while returning home from prayers at a local mosque in Quetta. Between January 1998 and
January 1999, it was estimated that up to 12 Afghan moderates or former members of the Communist Party were killed by
unknown assailants (see Section 2.d.). Among those reported killed were Dagarwal Basir, General Nazar Mohammed,
Dagarwal Latif, Hashim Paktyanai, General Shirin Agha, and General Rahim. To date, there have been no arrests or
convictions in connection with these killings.
In May heavy fighting broke out between Indian forces and Kashmiri militants in the Kargil sector of Indian-held Kashmir.
Regular Pakistani forces also were involved in this engagement, which did not end until Pakistani forces withdrew in July.
Tension along the line of control was high during this period, and there was shelling in several sectors. On June 10, the
Pakistani army returned the bodies of six Indian soldiers, which bore signs of severe torture; however, the International
Committee of the Red Cross declined an invitation to do an autopsy. A senior police official in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir
estimated that approximately 40 civilians were killed on the Pakistani side of the line of control.
b. Disappearance
There were no confirmed cases of politically motivated disappearances. Those killed in intra-Mohajir violence in Karachi
sometimes are first held briefly by opposing groups (or, as the MQM-Altaf alleges, by security forces) and tortured.
However, bodies of these victims, often mutilated, generally are dumped in the street soon after the victims are abducted;
however, the incidence of such crimes decreased greatly during year.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
The Constitution and the Penal Code expressly forbid torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; however,
police regularly torture, beat, and otherwise abuse persons. Police routinely use force to elicit confessions; however, there
were fewer such reports during the year than in previous years, particularly in Sindh after the coup, and human rights
organizations reported greater cooperation from the police in investigating such cases than in previous years. Human rights
observers suggest that because of the widespread use of physical torture by the police, suspects usually confess to crimes
regardless of their guilt or innocence; the courts subsequently throw out many such confessions.
Common torture methods include: beating; burning with cigarettes; whipping the soles of the feet; sexual assault; prolonged
isolation; electric shock; denial of food or sleep; hanging upside down; forced spreading of the legs with bar fetters; and
public humiliation. Some magistrates help cover up the abuse by issuing investigation reports stating that the victims died of
natural causes.
Torture by the police of persons in custody occurs throughout the country. Police tortured or mistreated prisoners
considered to be opponents or critics of the Sharif Government. On January 4, Senator Aftab Sheikh and other MQM
officials visited two MQM members of the provincial assembly at Karachi central prison, including former Labor Minister
Shoaib Bukhari. The parliamentarians accused the police of torturing and humiliating them for 10 days after their arrest on
November 20, 1998. The prisoners claimed that they had been struck with rifle butts, slapped, stripped naked, and forced to
stand continuously for up to 36 hours. Seventy prisoners awaiting or undergoing trial at Karachi prison, all MQM
members, charged that they had been arrested illegally and tortured to induce confessions. Family members alleged that
they also often had been beaten in raids, and that relatives had been taken as hostage for those whom the police sought.
Opposition leader Hussain Haqqani alleged that he was tortured, beaten, and subjected to psychological abuse during his
incarceration by the Intelligence Bureau between May 4 and May 7. Haqqani was arrested on previous dormant corruption
charges; he claimed that this was a pretext for his arrest. Records of a medical examination conducted by the High Court
after Haqqani's interrogation subsequently were "lost" by authorities. Haqqani was transferred to the Federal Investigative
Agency (FIA) on May 7, but remained incarcerated for 21/2 months. During the May 8 arrest of journalist Najam Sethi,
Sethi's wife reportedly was tied up by police (see Section 2.a.).
In May Asif Zardari, husband of former Pakistan People's Party (PPP) Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, was taken from
prison to a police interrogation center in Karachi, where he was kept awake for 4 days, beaten, and cut with knives. On May
19, he was taken to a hospital for treatment. Observers doubted police claims that cuts on his neck were the result of a
suicide attempt. In August the secretary general of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) noted in a public statement that the
IPU was "alarmed" over the alleged torture of Zardari.
Despite some cases during the year in which police officers were investigated or charged in connection with abuse of
detainees, the failure of successive governments effectively to prosecute and to punish abusers is the single greatest obstacle
to ending or reducing the incidence of abuse by the police. The authorities sometimes transferred, suspended, or arrested
offending officers, but seldom prosecuted or punished them. Investigating officers generally shield their colleagues.
Amnesty International (AI) estimates that at least 100 persons die from police torture each year. The failure to prosecute
and punish abusers in a timely fashion was one of the chief arguments used by the Government in introducing the 15th
Amendment designed to enforce Shari'a law throughout the country in 1998.
The 1997 Anti-Terrorism Act allowed confessions obtained while in police custody to be used to convict defendants in the
new "special courts." Human rights organizations and the press criticized this provision of the law, as it commonly is
believed that the police regularly torture suspects. Police generally did not attempt to use confessions to secure convictions
under this law and the Government agreed to amend the law after the Supreme Court in 1998 invalidated this and other
sections of the Anti-Terrorist Act.
Due to greater scrutiny by NGO's and the media, as well as a program of prison inspections in the Punjab, the incidence of
torture and abuse may be decreasing in prisons. In Karachi human rights groups are active in particular cases and the
Citizens Police Liaison Committee (CPLC) has been effective in bringing cases against police who make false arrests,
practice torture, or take bribes. Cooperation between the CPLC and the police human rights complaint cell resulted in the
dismissal of 216 policemen and demotion or fines for 1,226 during the 9 months between November 1998 and July 1999.
Corruption is an endemic problem among local police officers. Police and prison officials frequently use the threat of abuse
to extort money from prisoners and their families. Police accept money for registration of cases on false charges and may
torture innocent citizens. Persons pay police to humiliate their opponents and to avenge their personal grievances.
In the past, successive governments recruited police officers in violation of considerations of merit and the department's
regulations. In some instances, recruits had criminal records. In 1997 Punjab province Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif
declared that his own police were "corrupt and inefficient." He appointed new senior officials to improve effectiveness,
while resisting pressure to appoint those recommended by influential supporters to police positions. In an attempt to
increase police professionalism, a Punjab elite police training academy was established in November 1997 and began
training hundreds of constables. It is widely acknowledged that police corruption is most serious at the level of the Station
House Officer (SHO), the official who runs each individual precinct. In 1998 300 new SHO's recruited on merit were due
to begin a long-delayed 20-month special training course. If they are allowed to replace corrupt SHO's, observers believe
that they might improve police performance greatly. However, SHO's are very powerful (it is suspected that some have
killed senior police officers that were trying to inhibit their corruption), and observers question whether their replacement is
feasible.
It is accepted commonly, and high-ranking government officials have stated publicly, that police stations are sold--meaning
that police officials pay bribes to politicians and senior officials in the department in order to get posted to the police
stations of their choice. The police then recoup their investment by extorting money from the citizenry.
Even when actions are taken to address police abuses, the results are often mixed. In urban Sindh, the operation of
citizen-police liaison committees helped to curb some police excesses, but there are still many complaints of police abuse.
Special women's police stations were established in 1994 in response to growing numbers of complaints of custodial abuse
of women, including rape. These police stations are staffed by female personnel, but receive even less material and human
resources than regular police stations, according to human rights advocates. According to the government's own
Commission of Inquiry for Women, the stations do not function independently or fulfill their purpose. Despite court orders
and regulations requiring that female suspects be interrogated only by female police officers, women continued to be
detained overnight at regular police stations and abused by male officers. In a study of Lahore newspapers from January to
May 1999, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan found 11 cases of violence, rape, or torture of women while in
police custody. In August 1998, "Nasreen" accused the SHO of Lahore's Mozang police station of raping her after she
visited the station to register a complaint against her in-laws. At the end of 1998, the case was under internal investigation
by Lahore police; the disposition of the case was unknown at year's end. Instances of abuse of women in prisons are less
frequent than in police stations. Sexual abuse of child detainees by police or guards is reportedly a problem as well.
The Hudood Ordinances, promulgated by the central martial law government in l979, were an attempt to make the Penal
Code more Islamic. These ordinances provide for harsh punishments for violations of Shari'a (Islamic law), including death
by stoning for unlawful sexual relations and amputation for some other crimes. These severe Koranic penalties--known as
Hadd punishments--require a high standard of evidence. In effect, four adult Muslim men of good character must witness
an act for a Hadd punishment to apply. In 20 years, not a single Hadd punishment has been carried out. However, on the
basis of lesser evidence, ordinary punishments such as jail terms or fines are imposed. From 1979 to 1995, over 1 million
Hudood cases were filed with the police, and 300,000 have been heard by the courts. The laws are applied to Muslims and
non-Muslims alike.
Women frequently are charged under the Hudood laws on sexual misconduct, such as adultery. Approximately one-third of
the women in jails in Lahore, Peshawar, and Mardan in 1998 were awaiting trial for adultery. Most women tried under the
ordinance are acquitted, but the stigma of having been jailed for adultery is severe. A Hudood law meant to deter false
accusations is enforced weakly, and one human rights monitor has claimed that 80 percent of all adultery-related Hudood
cases are filed without any supporting evidence. According to Amnesty International, men accused of rape sometimes are
acquitted and released while their victims are held on adultery charges. The Commission of Inquiry for Women has
recommended that the Hudood laws be repealed, as they are based on an erroneous interpretation of Shari'a (see Section 5).
The Federal Crimes Regulation (FCR), which applies in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), allows the
punishment of relatives, friends, and neighbors of suspects. Authorities are empowered to blockade villages or to detain
fellow members of a fugitive's tribe in order to obtain the surrender of a fugitive. In December 1998, a Shariat court
established by the Tehrik-i-Tulaba, an extremist Islamic group in Orakzai Tribal Agency, fined six alleged accomplices to a
killing and burned down their homes as punishment (see Sections 1.e. and 1.f.).
Police routinely use excessive force against demonstrators or strikers. In February police forcibly dispersed a
demonstration in Lahore staged by the Jamaat-i-Islami. Police with batons charged demonstrators and fired tear gas shells
into the party's Lahore offices. On September 11, police reportedly used force to break up a demonstration by a coalition of
opposition groups in Karachi, and the headquarters of two major opposition parties, the MQM and the PPP, reportedly
were damaged. On September 12, police used water cannons, teargas, and sticks to break up a PPP-organized sit-in in
Karachi. In mid-October, the press reported that police used force to break up a rally in support of former Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif; more than one dozen protestors reportedly were arrested in Karachi on October 14. On December 11, police
used force to disperse a demonstration in Lahore that was held to protest the handling of a serial murder case by the police.
Police charged the crowd, beat persons with batons, and arrested 30 persons.
Police at times also beat and arrested journalists. For example, during a December 11 protest against the handling of a
criminal case in Lahore, the police beat press photographers and smashed their cameras after photographers reportedly
recognized a plainclothes policeman, who was hurling bricks into the crowd.
Police authorities failed in some instances to protect members of religious minorities--particularly Ahmadis and
Christians-- from societal attacks (see Section 5).
On January 3, several persons were injured when a bomb placed under a bridge outside of Lahore exploded, in what was
believed to be an assassination attempt against Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (see Section 1.a.). On September 6, an
explosion in a madrassah in Karachi injured more than 20 persons; those injured had rushed to the scene of a previous
explosion, in which there were no injuries. On April 17, unidentified men threw small explosives at the home of the Army
Corps Commander in Peshawar, injuring five guards. On November 12, a series of rocket attacks in Islamabad injured one
person. There were several other bombings during the year, some of which resulted in injuries. The perpetrators of most
such bombings were unknown at year's end.
Prison conditions are extremely poor. Overcrowding is a major problem. According to the Human Rights Commission of
Pakistan (HRCP), there are currently 82,000 prisoners in Pakistani jails, which have an officially authorized population of
35,833; most prisoners are held in severely overcrowded conditions. In September an investigative reporter for The Nation
visited Adiala jail in Rawalpindi. According to the reporter, the prison currently holds 4,277 prisoners but was built for
2,000. A press survey in July revealed that the 16 jails of Sindh province, with a total capacity of 7,769 prisoners, were
actually housing over 14,000. Karachi central prison is the most overcrowded, with a population of 4,460 prisoners and a
capacity for only 991; only 2 toilets are available for each 100 prisoners in the lowest classification of cells. The HRCP
claims that the Lahore district jail, built to house 1,045 prisoners, contains 3,200. The Punjab Home Department admitted
before the Lahore High Court in July that over 50,000 prisoners were being held in Punjabi jails meant for 17,271. The
department claimed that it had plans on the books to build new jails in 22 district and subdivisional headquarters, but that
the work had been delayed by financial constraints. Some 80 percent of prisoners are "awaiting trial," mostly for petty
offenses.
Prisoners in jail routinely are shackled. The principal of the institute for jail staff training in Lahore admitted in a July press
interview that fettering is the most convenient way of administering an overcrowded jail. While the Pakistan Prison Act of
1894 permits fettering for a variety of offenses, the punishment is usually given for administrative convenience, or to extract
bribes from prisoners. (The shackles used are tight, heavy, and painful, and reportedly have led to gangrene and amputation
in several cases.) Although the Sindh High Court ruled the practice illegal in 1993, the practice continues, and outside
observers visiting Sindhi jails regularly see fettered prisoners.
There are three classes (A, B, and C) of prison facilities. Class "C" cells generally hold common criminals and those in
pretrial detention. Such cells often have dirt floors, no furnishings, and poor food. Prisoners in these cells reportedly suffer
the most abuse, such as beatings and being forced to kneel for long periods. In 1998, the Senate's Committee on Human
Rights reported to the Prime Minister that at one facility in Hyderabad, 60 prisoners were confined in a space 100 feet by
30 feet with only 1 latrine. Such unsanitary conditions are common in small, poorly ventilated, and decrepit colonial-era
prisons. Inadequate food, often consisting of only a few pieces of bread, leads to chronic malnutrition for those unable to
supplement their diet with help from family or friends. Access to medical care is a problem. Mentally ill prisoners usually
are not provided with adequate treatment and often are not segregated from the general prison population. Foreign prisoners
often remain in prison long after their sentences are completed because there is no one to pay for their deportation to their
home country. Conditions in "B" and "A" cells are markedly better than in "C" cells. Prisoners in "A" cells are permitted to
have servants, special food, and televisions. The authorities reserve "A" cells for prominent persons. Especially prominent
individuals--including some political figures--sometimes are held under house arrest and permitted to receive visitors.
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
Landlords in rural Sindh and political factions in Karachi operated private jails (see Section 1.d.).
On June 10, during the Kargil conflict, the Pakistani army returned the bodies of six Indian soldiers, which bore signs of
severe torture; however, the International Committee of the Red Cross declined an invitation to do an autopsy (see Section
1.a.).
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The law regulates arrest and detention procedures; however, the authorities do not always comply with the law and police
arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens. The law permits a Deputy Commissioner (DC) of a local district to order detention
without charge for 30 days of persons suspected of threatening public order and safety. The DC may renew detention in
30-day increments, up to a total of 90 days. Human rights monitors report instances in which prisoners jailed under the
Maintenance of Public Order Act have been imprisoned for up to 6 months without charge. For other criminal offenses, the
police may hold a suspect for 24 hours without charge. After the prisoner is produced before a magistrate, the court can
grant permission for continued detention for a maximum period of 14 days if the police provide material proof that this is
necessary for an investigation.
Police may arrest individuals on the basis of a First Incident Report (FIR) filed by a complainant. The police have been
known to file FIR's without supporting evidence. FIR's frequently are used to harass or intimidate individuals. Charges
against an individual also may be based on a "blind" FIR, which lists the perpetrators as "person or persons unknown." If
the case is not solved, the FIR is placed in the inactive file. When needed, a FIR is reactivated and taken to a magistrate by
the police, who then name a suspect and ask that the suspect be remanded for 14 days while they investigate further. After
14 days, the case is dropped for lack of evidence, but then another FIR is activated and brought against the accused. In this
manner, rolling charges can be used to hold a suspect in continuous custody.
If the police can provide material proof that detention (physical remand or police custody for the purpose of interrogation)
is necessary for an investigation, a court may extend detention for a total of 14 days. However, such proof may be little
more than unsubstantiated assertions by the police. In practice the authorities do not fully observe the limits on detention.
Police are not required to notify anyone when an arrest is made and often hold detainees without charge until a court
challenges them. The police sometimes detain individuals arbitrarily without charge or on false charges, in order to extort
payment for their release. Human rights monitors report that a number of police stations have secret detention cells in which
individuals are kept while the police bargain for a higher price for their release. There are also reports that the police move
prisoners from one police station to another if they suspect a surprise visit by higher authorities. Some women continue to
be detained arbitrarily and sexually abused (see Section 1.c.). Police also detain relatives of wanted criminals in order to
compel suspects to surrender (see Section 1.f.). Police have been known to detain persons in connection with personal
vendettas.
The law stipulates that detainees must be brought to trial within 30 days of their arrest. However, in many cases, trials do
not start until 6 months after the filing of charges. In 1998 the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan estimated that there
were almost as many individuals awaiting trial in jails as there were prisoners. According to the chief justice of the Lahore
High Court, there were over 500,000 civil and criminal cases backlogged in the province's subordinate court system as of
April. In 62 Lahore city courts, 7,000 prisoners are awaiting trial in 6,000 cases. In 3,500 of these cases, the police have not
even brought a "challan," or indictment, to the court. In 1997 the Government justified the creation of antiterrorist courts by
citing the large number of murder and other cases that are clogging the regular court system (see Section 1.e.).
Asif Zardari, husband of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, has waited for over 2 years for his trial on charges of
killing his brother-in-law, Murtaza Bhutto, to begin. Charges were first filed against Zardari in July 1997 and transferred
successively to two different courts, where several judges refused to preside. To date only 2 of 223 witnesses have been
heard.
The Government permits visits by human rights monitors, family members, and lawyers. However, in some cases,
authorities refuse family visits and in some police stations, persons are expected to pay bribes in order to visit a prisoner.
The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) have a separate legal system, the Frontier Crimes Regulation, which
recognizes the doctrine of collective responsibility. Authorities are empowered to detain fellow members of a fugitive's tribe,
or to blockade the fugitive's village, pending his surrender or punishment by his own tribe in accordance with local tradition.
The Government continued to exercise such authority, repeatedly, during the year. Roman Ali, arrested in 1993 at the age of
12 for his fugitive elder brother's crimes, was sentenced to a long prison term in 1994. In 1996, a petition against this
sentence in the Peshawar High Court was dismissed. During the year, Ali's appeal to the Secretary of the Home Department
was denied, and his appeal to the Supreme Court was not heard due to the Court's lack of jurisdiction over the case.
The Government sometimes uses mass arrests to quell possible civil unrest. In April approximately 600 PPP members were
arrested prior to a planned May 1 demonstration in Islamabad against former prime minister Benazir Bhutto's April
conviction on corruption charges and disqualification from holding public office. Most were released on May 2. Early on
July 28, police tore down antigovernment posters and arrested MQM legislators and activists to halt a peaceful hunger
strike being conducted in front of the Karachi Press Club. Most of those arrested were released quickly, and the protest was
resumed a few hours later. In August and September, police arrested as many as 2,500 activists from the PPP and the
Muttahida Quami Movement in Karachi and other parts of Sindh province in anticipation of a September 4 opposition rally.
Several hundred more, including several senior opposition leaders and parliamentarians, were arrested several days later
prior to an opposition demonstration in Karachi. On September 11, police reportedly used force to end a demonstration by
a coalition of opposition groups in Karachi; police publicly reported arresting 107 persons in connection with the
demonstration, but other reliable estimates place the number arrested at 600 or more. Police detained hundreds of MQM
and PPP activists and senior leaders prior to a banned opposition march planned for September 25, as well as in the days
immediately after it was to have occurred. Among those detained was MQM Senator Nasreen Jalil, who was arrested at her
home on September 24 and held incommunicado for several days (see Section 2.b.) until her release on September 29. Also
in September, the Government placed Fazlur Rehman, the leader of one faction of the religious party Jamiat Ulema-i-Islami,
under house arrest to prevent him from traveling to the NWFP tribal areas to attend a political rally. Rehman previously had
traveled frequently to the region to attend rallies, which are prohibited in the tribal areas. Rehman was released after 3 days
(see Sections 2.a., 2.b., and 2.d.). In early October, hundreds of religious extremists, including the leader of the
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, Maulana Muhammad Azam Tariq, and SSP branch president Maulana Mohammad Ahmad
Ludhianvi, were arrested after a wave of sectarian violence broke out in Punjab and Sindh. However, since the coup, there
have been reports that arrests of political activists have decreased.
The Sharif Government's "accountability cell," which ostensibly was created to uncover corruption in an evenhanded
manner, was headed by a close associate of the Prime Minister, Senator Saifur Rehman, and conducted politically driven
investigations of, and campaigns of vilification against, opposition politicians, senior civil servants, and business figures.
These investigations were designed to extract evidence and in some cases, the televised confessions of alleged wrongdoers.
Rehman may have arranged for the arrest of Hussain Haqqani and Najam Sethi (see Section 2.a.). However, before the
coup, most politicians and bureaucrats who had been charged with corruption or other crimes were out on bail. In 1998,
authorities arrested and questioned the wife and daughter of former Pakistan Steel executive Usman Farooqi in an attempt
to pressure the already-imprisoned Farooqi. At year's end, Farooqi remained in detention. In 1998 in an effort to compel a
former bureaucrat to return to Pakistan, the Government prevented the departure of family members, even those who were
not citizens of Pakistan, on the grounds that they were "beneficiaries" of alleged corruption. In July 1998, the Lahore High
Court ruled that this approach was invalid.
In several high-profile arrests of Sharif Government critics, the police or intelligence services entered homes and arrested
individuals without warrants or due process and held them for periods of days or weeks. On May 4, Intelligence Bureau
officials arrested opposition leader and journalist Hussain Haqqani without a warrant and held him incommunicado until
May 7 without filing charges (see Section 1.c.). On May 8, approximately 30 policemen broke into Friday Times editor
Najam Sethi's home, beat him, tied up his wife, destroyed property, and took Sethi away without warrant. According to
press reports, Sethi was interrogated by the intelligence services as a suspected "espionage agent." Sethi was held
incommunicado for several days and denied access to an attorney (see Section 2.a.).
On occasion, persons are detained arbitrarily because of disputes with powerful or well-connected persons. On January 28,
Humaira Mahmood and her husband Mahmood Butt were detained without a warrant by Punjab police at the Karachi
airport (in Sindh province), as they were trying to leave the country. Mahmood Butt's mother was also detained. In 1997 the
couple had married against the wishes of Humaira's father, Abbas Khokar, a member of the Punjab Provincial Assembly
(see Section 5). Mahmood and her husband reportedly were taken separately to Lahore, where they were detained
separately and were beaten in an attempt to force them to renounce their marriage. On February 1, the pair appeared in court
in Lahore. After the hearing, Mahmood Butt and his mother were released by court order; Humaira was released by court
order on February 18.
The Musharraf Government detained without a warrant and without charge several dozen political figures, military officers,
government administrators, and Sharif family members following the October 12 coup. Nawaz Sharif and members of his
family, including Punjab chief minister Shahbaz Sharif; most of the Cabinet; several senior advisors to the Prime Minister
or to the Government; and a number of military and police officials were arrested or placed under house arrest immediately
following the coup. Nawaz Sharif was held incommunicado from the time of his arrest until he was brought to court on
November 18. Most others were released within a few days; however, at year's end, 32 were estimated to remain in custody.
Many of those arrested immediately after the coup were held incommunicado. Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and
his brother, former Punjab chief minister Shahbaz Sharif, were held incommunicado in Chaklala, Rawalpindi; many other
Sharif family members were held with limited outside contact in "protective custody" in the Sharif estate outside of Lahore
following the coup. The oldest son of Nawaz Sharif, Hussain Sharif, reportedly was held incommunicado, except for one
occasion on which he was allowed access to counsel, in solitary confinement from October 12 until a court-ordered visit
with his wife on December 11. Other Sharif family members still in detention at year's end included Nawaz Sharif's father
Mian Mohammad Sharif; his brother Abbas Sharif; his son-in-law Captain Safdar; his nephew Hamza Shahbaz (son of
Shahbaz Sharif), and his brother-in-law Chaudhry Sher Ali. Former Information Minister Mushahid Hussain was kept in
"protective custody," along with his family, at his residence in Islamabad from October 12 until December 14, when he was
removed by military officers from his home and taken to a government guest house in Islamabad. He then was held
incommunicado by the military until December 24, when he was allowed to meet with his family under a court order.
Several key figures among those initially arrested without charge, including Nawaz Sharif, were being held in connection
with the "hijacking" of General Musharraf's airplane on October 12. On that day, General Musharraf was returning from a
conference in Sri Lanka, and the commercial aircraft in which he was flying initially was denied permission to land in
Karachi, purportedly under orders from Prime Minister Sharif. This event, along with Sharif's summary replacement of
General Musharraf with the Director General of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, Khawaja Ziauddin, led to the
coup. Military officers took over the airport in Karachi and allowed Musharraf's airplane to land. In the weeks following
Sharif's arrest, he was detained without charge and was denied access to counsel and to family members (See Sections 1.d.
and 1.e.). A First Incident Report was not filed in the case until November 10. The FIR charged Sharif with attempted
murder, hijacking, and criminal conspiracy. Former Sharif advisor Ghous Ali Shah, former Pakistan International Airlines
(PIA) chairman Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, former Director of Civil Aviation Aminullah Chaudhary, and former Inspector
General of Police Rana Maqbool were charged along with Sharif. The accused were to be tried before an antiterrorism
court. Nawaz Sharif was formally arrested and remanded to police custody only after being brought to Karachi on
November 18. On November 19, Sharif first appeared in an antiterrorism court in Karachi. On November 26, three other
individuals--former Punjab chief minister Shahbaz Sharif, former Senator Saifur Rehman, and former secretary to the
Prime Minister Saeed Mehdi--were named codefendants in the case. Sharif complained of "inhumane" treatment during his
incarceration, including being held incommunicado in a cramped cell. On November 29, the judge in the case ordered him
transferred to an "A" class cell. Following changes in the Antiterrorism Act (see Section 1.e.), the formal filing of charges
(challan) against Nawaz Sharif occurred on December 8. Nawaz Sharif and his brother Shahbaz Sharif were paroled briefly
on December 15 and flown by the authorities to Lahore, the day after the death of Nawaz Sharif's mother-in-law.
Although many of those detained immediately following the coup were released in the days afterwards or subsequently
were charged through the court system, several individuals remained in custody without charge. As of year's end, former
ministers Muhammed Ishaq Dar, Sayed Mushahid Hussain, and Chaudry Nisar Ali Khan; former Director General of the
Inter-Services Intelligence Bureau Khawaja Ziauddin; Mujibur Rehman, brother of Saifur Rehman; former Director
General of the Federal Investigative Agency Mohammed Mushtaq; and several other officials and members of Parliament
or provincial assemblies apparently still were detained without charge.
Private jails are believed to exist in tribal and feudal areas. Human rights groups allege that as many as 50 private jails,
housing some 4,500 bonded laborers, were being maintained by landlords in lower Sindh. Some prisoners reportedly have
been held for many years. In the five districts of upper Sindh, landlords have been defying the courts and police by holding
tribal jirgas, which settle feuds and award fines as well as the death penalty--even in jails--in defiance of provincial laws.
The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and the district administration in Umerkot, Sindh, attempted in April to the
release of a family of agricultural workers from their landlord's private jail in Kunri. A member of the family, Mangal Bheel,
escaped from the prison in January, and approached authorities for help.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Until the October coup, the Constitution provided for an independent judiciary; however, in practice, the judiciary was
subject to political influence under the Sharif Government. A series of events in 1997 led to serious concerns about the
prestige and independence of the judiciary under the Sharif Government. However, under Sharif the Supreme Court
demonstrated a continued degree of independence on a number of occasions. For example, the Supreme Court ruled in
February that the military courts used to try certain civilian cases were unconstitutional. After the coup, the Musharraf
regime pledged to respect the independence of the judicial system, despite having suspended the Constitution; however,
Provisional Constitution Order Number 1, issued on October 14, provided that all courts functioning at the time of the
change in government would continue to operate, but that no court would have the power to issue orders against General
Musharraf or any person exercising powers or jurisdiction under his authority, thereby effectively removing the actions of
the Musharraf regime from judicial oversight. However, by year's end the Musharraf regime had not acted to limit the
judiciary. On November 15, PML legislator Zafar Ali Shah filed a petition with the Supreme Court challenging the October
12 coup. At year's end, the Supreme Court was scheduled to hear arguments about the legality of the military takeover on
January 31, 2000. Under both Governments low salaries, inadequate resources, heavy workloads, and corruption contribute
to judicial inefficiency, particularly in the lower courts.
The judicial system involves several different court systems with overlapping and sometimes competing jurisdictions. There
are civil and criminal systems with special courts for banking, antinarcotics and antiterrorist cases, as well as the federal
Shariat Court for certain Hudood offenses. The Hudood ordinances criminalize nonmarital rape, extramarital sex (including
adultery and fornication), and various gambling, alcohol, and property offenses. The appeals process in the civil system is:
civil court; district court; High Court; and the Supreme Court. In the criminal system, the progression is magistrate,
sessions court, High Court, and the Supreme Court.
The judiciary has argued that it has not been able to try and convict terrorist suspects in a timely manner because of poor
police casework, prosecutorial negligence, and the resulting lack of evidence. In response to this problem, the Sharif
Government passed the Anti-Terrorist Act in 1997; special antiterrorist courts began operation in August 1997. The
antiterrorist courts, designed for the speedy punishment of terrorist suspects, have special streamlined procedures but due to
continued terrorist intimidation of witnesses, police, and judges, produced only a handful of convictions of terrorist suspects
in 1998. Under the Anti-Terrorist Act, terrorist killings are punishable by death and any act, including speech, intended to
stir up religious hatred is punishable by up to 7 years' rigorous imprisonment. Cases are to be decided within 7 working
days, but judges are free to extend the period of time as conditions require. Trials in absentia were permitted, then
subsequently prohibited in October 1998. Appeals to an appellate tribunal also were required to take no more than 7 days,
but appellate authority since has been restored to the High and Supreme Courts, under which these time limits do not apply.
Under the Antiterrorist Act, bail is not to be granted if the court has reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is guilty.
Because of the law's bail provisions, Islamic scholar Yusuf Ali was unable to obtain bail. After the suspension of this
provision, judges continued to avoid hearing his bail application. He was held in a "C" class cell from March 1997 until his
release in June.
Leading members of the judiciary, human rights groups, the press, and politicians from a number of parties expressed
strong reservations about the antiterrorist courts, charging that they constitute a parallel judicial system and could be used as
tools of political repression. Government officials and police believed that the deterrent effect of the act's death penalty
provisions contributed significantly to a reduction in sectarian terror after its passage. The antiterrorist courts also are
empowered to try persons accused of particularly "heinous" crimes, such as gang rape and child killings, and several
convicts have been executed under these provisions. In 1997 cases filed under section 295(a) of the Penal Code (one of the
so-called blasphemy laws) were transferred to the antiterrorist courts. Human rights advocates feared that if blasphemy
cases were tried in the antiterrorist courts, alleged blasphemers, who in the past normally were granted bail or released for
lack of evidence were likely to be convicted, given the less stringent rules of evidence required under the Anti-Terrorism
Act.
In November 1998, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced the establishment of military courts in Karachi, which had
been under Governor's Rule since October 1998. These courts were to try cases involving heinous acts and terrorism, which
the Government stated were a serious challenge to public authority that the existing court system was inadequate to address.
They were intended to bring swifter justice to the city, which had been plagued by terrorism, violence, and a general
breakdown in law and order. Military courts began operating in December 1998. In January the Supreme Court ruled in an
interim decision that military trial courts could not impose the death penalty. On February 17, the Supreme Court ruled that
the military courts were unconstitutional and ordered the establishment of additional antiterrorist courts; however, it allowed
the sentences already handed down by the military courts to stand. The antiterrorist courts were to operate under the
supervision of two Supreme Court justices, and both courts of first instance and appellate courts were to render decisions
within 7 days; in practice, this did not occur. In response, on April 27, the Sharif Government promulgated an ordinance
transferring cases from military trial courts to antiterrorist courts and expanded the jurisdiction to cover the same types of
offenses as the military courts, including murder, gang rape, and child molestation. Various "civil commotion" offenses
(including writing graffiti and putting up wall posters) also were added to the jurisdiction of the antiterrorist courts. In
August the Sharif Government again promulgated the April antiterrorism ordinance but dropped the injunctions against
graffiti and wall posters. The April ordinance made strikes and go-slows illegal as "civil commotion" offenses; both were
punishable by incarceration and fine (see Section 2.b. and Section 6). Prior to August, some opposition leaders and
members of the human rights community feared that the "civil commotion" offenses would be used to suppress political
dissent. In the first 7 months of the year, the military trial courts, which operated until mid-February, sentenced two persons
to death in Sindh, and antiterrorism courts subsequently sentenced 42 persons to death in the same province. Two of the
sentences have been carried out and the rest are on appeal. On December 2, the Musharraf Government again modified the
ATA provisions, by adding a number of additional offenses to the ATA, including acts to outrage religious feelings; efforts
to "wage war against the state"; conspiracy; acts committed in abetting an offense; and kidnaping or abduction to confine a
person. By ordinance the Musharraf regime created a special antiterrorist court in Sindh presided over by a High Court
justice rather than a lower level judge, as is usually the case. The amended provision permits the High Court justice to
"transfer...any case pending before any other special court...and try the case" in his court. Supporters of Nawaz Sharif
maintained that these changes were designed to assist the Musharraf regime with its prosecution of Sharif.
The Musharraf regime also established special courts to deal with "accountability," or corruption, cases. On November 16,
the Musharraf regime created by ordinance a National Accountability Bureau (NAB) and special accountability courts to try
corruption cases. The NAB was given broad powers to prosecute such cases, and the accountability courts were expected to
try cases within 30 days. The ordinance allows those suspected of defaulting on government loans or of corrupt practices to
be detained for 90 days without charge and, prior to being charged, does not allow access to counsel. The NAB was created
in part to deal with as much as $4 billion (approximately PRs 208 billion) that it is estimated is owed to the country's banks
(all of which are state-owned) by debtors, mainly from among the wealthy elite. It was believed that many wealthy and
politically well connected persons had taken out bank loans over the years with no intention of repaying them. The NAB
has stated that it would not target genuine business failures or small defaulters and does not appear to have done so. In
accountability cases, there is a presumption of guilt, and conviction under the ordinance can result in 14 years'
imprisonment; fines; and confiscation of property. Those convicted also are disqualified from running for office or holding
office for 21 years. According to unconfirmed press reports, the Musharraf regime made an informal decision that the
military and the judiciary would not fall under the jurisdiction of the NAB. The Musharraf regime denied this. However, by
year's end, no serving members of the military or the judiciary have been charged by the NAB. On November 17, the day
after General Musharraf's well-publicized 4-week grace period to repay loans expired, the military began arresting those
suspected of defaulting on bank loans. Persons were arrested throughout the country on default or corruption charges; by
year's end, it was estimated that at least 100 persons may have been arrested on charges of defaulting on bank loans or
corruption. Those arrested were prominent persons, from across the business and political spectrums; some were also
retired military personnel and government bureaucrats. Those included on a published list of persons charged with
corruption by the NAB included deposed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. On
December 27, former Punjab chief minister Arif Nakai was disqualified from holding office for 21 years, after he admitted
on December 18 that he took approximately $37,000 (PRs 1.9 million) from official accounts to finance his family's travel
to Saudi Arabia. Nakai repaid the amount to the NAB. Some persons expressed concern over the concentration of power in
the NAB, the fact that the NAB chairman is a member of the military, and the presumption of guilt imposed on those tried
for corruption.
The civil judicial system provides for an open trial, the presumption of innocence, cross-examination by an attorney, and
appeal of sentences. Attorneys are appointed for indigents only in capital cases. There are no jury trials. Due to the limited
number of judges, the heavy backlog of cases, and lengthy court procedures, cases routinely take years, although defendants
are required to make frequent court appearances. Under both the Hudood and standard criminal codes, there are bailable
and nonbailable offenses. According to the Criminal Procedures Code, the accused in bailable offenses must be granted
bail. The Code also stipulates that those accused in nonbailable offenses should be granted bail if the crime of which they
are accused carries a sentence of less than 10 years. Many accused, especially well-connected individuals who are made
aware of impending warrants against them, are also able to obtain pre-arrest bail, and thus they are spared both arrest and
incarceration.
The federal Shariat Court and the Shari'a bench of the Supreme Court serve as appellate courts for certain convictions in
criminal court under the Hudood ordinances. The federal Shariat Court also may overturn any legislation judged to be
inconsistent with the tenets of Islam. However, these cases may be appealed to the Shari'a bench of the Supreme Court. In
two areas of NWFP--Malakand and Kohistan--Shari'a law was instituted beginning in January, in the first by regulation
and the second by an ordinance. On September 20, a bill was passed by the NWFP Assembly that incorporated the
Kohistan ordinance into law; Shari'a law now applies in Kohistan (see Section 2.c.).
The judicial process continued to be impeded by bureaucratic infighting, inactivity, and the overlapping jurisdictions of the
different court systems. Heavy backlogs that severely delayed the application of justice remained, due to scores of unfilled
judgeships and to archaic and inefficient court procedures. The politicized appointment process also holds up the
promotion of many lower court judges to the High Courts. Although the higher level judiciary is considered competent and
generally honest, there are widespread reports of corruption among lower level magistrates and minor court functionaries.
On June 11, 16-year-old Mohammad Saleem was convicted by an antiterrorist court of killing three police officers;
however, Saleem was tried and acquitted of the same charges by a court in January on the grounds of insufficient evidence
and lack of a motive.
On August 21, two MQM members, Mohammed Saleem and Ahmed Saeed, were convicted in an antiterrorist court of the
1997 killings of two foreign employees of Union Texas Petroleum and their driver. The two were sentenced to death, as
well as to and approximately $40,000 (PRs 2 million) in fines. Many questioned the fairness of the trial, since the
convictions were based largely on the confessions of the accused; the confessions later were retracted on the grounds that
they were obtained by the police through the use of torture.
Persons in jail awaiting trial sometimes are held for periods longer than the sentence they would receive if convicted. Court
officials report that each judge reviews between 70 and 80 cases per day, but that action is taken on only 3 or 4 each week.
Eighty thousand criminal cases were reported pending in Sindh at the end of 1997, 67,800 of which were in Karachi. The
Law Ministry, in reply to a question in the National Assembly in 1997, reported that there were over 150,000 cases pending
with the superior judiciary, which includes the Supreme Court and the four provincial High Courts. During the year, there
were approximately 125,000 cases pending. Clogged lower courts exacerbate the situation; the majority of cases in the High
Courts consist of appeals of lower court rulings. Once an appeal reaches the High Court, there are further opportunities for
delay because decisions of individual judges frequently are referred to panels composed of two or three judges. There
continued to be charges that magistrates and police, under pressure to achieve high conviction rates, persuade detainees to
plead guilty without informing them of the consequences. Politically powerful persons also attempt to influence magistrates'
decisions and have used various forms of pressure on magistrates, including the threat to transfer them to other
assignments.
Press reports in July noted that hundreds of prisoners remained in the Karachi central prison after the completion of their
sentences. The Sindh Home Department stated that at least 10 percent of under-trial prisoners in Karachi central prison had
no access to free legal aid or the possibility of bail, even if qualified. Reporters interviewing male prisoners in 1 block
discovered that 18 out of 110 prisoners, or 16 percent, were not represented by attorneys. As of March, 6,000 cases were
awaiting trial in 62 Lahore courts, with 7,000 prisoners awaiting a court date. In 3,500 of these cases, the police have not yet
submitted a "challan," or indictment.
The Penal Code incorporates the doctrine of Qisas (roughly, an eye for an eye) and Diyat (blood money). Qisas is not
known to have been invoked; however, the Penal Code's provision for Diyat occasionally is applied, particularly in the
NWFP, with the result that compensation is sometimes paid to the family of a victim in place of punishment of the
wrongdoer. Under these ordinances only the family of the victim, not the State, may pardon the defendant. The Hudood,
Qisas, and Diyat ordinances apply to both ordinary criminal courts and Shariat courts. According to Christian activists, if a
Muslim kills a non-Muslim, he can compensate for the crime by paying the victim's family Diyat; however, a non-Muslim
does not have the option of paying Diyat and must serve a jail sentence or face the death penalty for his crime. Failure to
pay Diyat in non-capital cases can result in indefinitely extended incarceration, under Section 331 of the Diyat ordinance. In
1998 the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan noted that there were 58 individuals still in prison after the completion of
their jail terms because they could not pay the Diyat. The HRCP made public the case of one such convict, Nosheran Khan,
in the NWFP. Khan has been in prison since 1996 and cannot be released until he pays his Diyat fine of approximately
$3,843 (PRs 20,000).
Appeals of certain Hudood convictions involving penalties in excess of 2 years' imprisonment are referred exclusively to the
Shariat courts and are heard jointly by Islamic scholars and High Court judges using ordinary criminal procedures. Judges
and attorneys must be Muslim and be familiar with Islamic law. Within these limits, defendants in a Shariat court are
entitled to the lawyer of their choice. There is a system of bail.
The Hudood ordinances criminalize nonmarital rape, extramarital sex (including adultery and fornication), and various
gambling, alcohol, and property offenses. Offenses are distinguished according to punishment, with some offenses liable to
Hadd, or Koranic punishment (see Section 1.c.), and others to Tazir, or secular punishment. Although both types of cases
are tried in ordinary criminal courts, special, more stringent rules of evidence apply in Hadd cases; Hadd punishments are
mandatory if there is enough evidence to support them. Hadd punishments regarding sexual offences are most severe for
married Muslims; for example, if a married Muslim man confesses to a rape or there are four adult male Muslim witnesses
to the act, the accused rapist must be stoned to death; if the accused rapist is not Muslim and/or married, if he confesses, or
if the act is witnessed by 4 adult males (not all Muslim), the accused must be sentenced to 100 lashes with a whip, and such
other punishment, including death, as the Court may deem fit in the case. The testimony of four female witnesses, or that of
the victim alone, is insufficient to impose Hadd punishments. If the evidence falls short of Hadd requirements, then the
accused may be sentenced to a lesser class of penalties (Tazir); since it is difficult to obtain sufficient evidence to support
the Hadd punishments, most rape cases are tried at the Tazir level of evidence and sentencing (under which a rapist may be
sentenced to up to 25 years in prison and 30 lashes). No Hadd punishment has ever been applied in the 20 years that the
Hudood ordinances have been in force. For Tazir punishments, there is no distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim
offenders. Under Tazir the evidentiary requirement for financial or future obligations is for two male witnesses or one male
and two female witnesses; in all other matters, the court may accept the testimony of one man or one woman (see Section
5).
Administration of justice in the FATA is normally the responsibility of tribal elders and maliks, or leaders. They may
conduct hearings according to Islamic law and tribal custom. In such proceedings the accused have no right to legal
representation, bail, or appeal. The usual penalties consist of fines, even for murder. However, the Government's political
agents, who are federal civil servants assigned to tribal agencies, oversee such proceedings and may impose prison terms of
up to 14 years. Paramilitary forces under the direction of the political agents frequently perform punitive actions during
enforcement operations. For example in raids on criminal activities, the authorities have been known to damage surrounding
homes as extrajudicial punishment of residents for having tolerated nearby criminal activity (see Sections 1.c. and 1.f.).
In remote areas outside the jurisdiction of federal political agents, tribal councils occasionally levy harsher, unsanctioned
punishments, including flogging or death by shooting or stoning. For example, in May a local "jirga," or council, sentenced
a man to death in Mohmand agency for the killing of relatives. The council also expelled the man's brother from the area. In
December 1998, a Shariat court established by the Tehrik-i-Tulaba, an extremist Islamic group in Orakzai Tribal Agency,
fined six alleged accomplices to a killing and burned down their homes as punishment.
Another related form of rough justice operating in the NWFP, particularly in the tribal areas, is the concept of Pakhtunwali,
or the Pakhtun Tribal Code, in which revenge is an important element. Under this code, a man, his family, and his tribe are
obligated to take revenge for wrongs--either real or perceived--in order to redeem their honor. More often than not, these
disputes arise over women and land, and frequently result in violence, such as the Samia Imran case (see Section 5), in
which a woman seeking a divorce against the wishes of her husband and family was shot and killed in April in the office of
lawyer Hina Jilani, apparently at the behest of her family.
There are limited numbers of political prisoners. Certain sections of the Penal Code directly target members of the Ahmadi
faith. Since they were adopted, Ahmadis incarcerated under these provisions number approximately 200, according to
Ahmadi sources. A number of minority religious groups argue that other sections of the Penal Code--particularly the
related blasphemy laws--are used in a discriminatory fashion by local officials or private individuals to punish religious
minorities. While precise numbers are unavailable, the Ahmadis estimate that 61 of their coreligionists were charged in
criminal cases "on a religious basis" as of August (see Section 2.c. and Section 5).
Some political groups also argue that they are marked for arrest based on their political affiliation. The Muttahida Quami
Movement, in particular, has argued that the Sharif Government has used antiterrorist court convictions in Sindh to silence
its activists. f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence
The Government infringes on citizen's privacy rights. The Anti-Terrorist Act allowed police, or military personnel acting as
police, to enter and to search homes and offices without search warrants, and to confiscate property or arms likely to be
used in a terrorist act (which is defined very broadly). This provision was never tested in the courts. While the Antiterrorist
Act was partially suspended in 1998, the Government promulgated new Antiterrorism Ordinances in October 1998 and in
April. By prior law, the police had to obtain a warrant to search a house, but they did not need a warrant to search a person.
Regardless of the law, the police entered homes without a warrant and have been known to steal valuables during searches.
In the absence of a warrant, a policeman is subject to charges of criminal trespass. However, policemen seldom are
punished for illegal entry. In late September, the family members of persons sought by the police in connection with a
banned opposition march reported forcible, warrantless searches of their homes (see Section 2.b.).
The Government maintains several domestic intelligence services that monitor politicians, political activists, suspected
terrorists, and suspected foreign intelligence agents. Credible reports indicate that the authorities routinely use wiretaps and
intercept and open mail. In his order dismissing former Prime Minister Bhutto in 1996, President Leghari accused the
Government of massive illegal wiretapping, including eavesdropping on the telephone conversations of judges, political
party leaders, and military and civilian officials. In 1997 the Supreme Court directed the federal Government to seek the
Court's permission before carrying out any future wiretapping or eavesdropping operations. Nonetheless, that same year, a
lawyer for a former director of the Intelligence Bureau, charged with illegal wiretapping during Benazir Bhutto's second
term in office, presented the Supreme Court with a list of 12 government agencies that still tapped and monitored telephone
calls of citizens. The case is pending in the Supreme Court. A press story in October 1998 quoted anonymous cabinet
ministers who complained of wiretapping of their telephones by the Intelligence Bureau.
Police sometimes arrest and detain relatives of wanted criminals in an attempt to compel suspects to surrender. In some
cases, the authorities have detained entire families in order to force a relative who was the subject of an arrest warrant to
surrender (see Section 1.d.). In September two adult children of opposition party leaders were arrested in Karachi when
police could not locate their parents in a sweep conducted by police prior to a planned opposition march (see Section 2.b.).
While the Government generally does not interfere with the right to marry, the Government on occasion assists influential
families in efforts to prevent marriages entered into without the consent of the families involved. For example, between
December 1998 and February, Punjabi police attempted to stop Humaira Mahmood and her husband Mahmood Butt from
living together as man and wife. The couple were married legally in 1997, but Humaira's father, Abbas Khokar, a member of
the Punjab provincial assembly, did not approve of the marriage and enlisted the police to help him prevent the pair from
living together once he discovered the marriage had taken place (see Section 5). In July police in Kot Ghulam Mohammed
(Mirpurkas district, Sindh) raided the home of Javed Dal and arrested his family members as hostages. Dal had eloped with
his cousin. His wife's father, Somar Dal, used his influence as a member of the Sindh National Front executive committee
to instigate the arrests, which were carried out without warrants (see Section 5). The authorities also fail to prosecute
vigorously cases in which families punish members (generally women) for marrying or seeking a divorce against the
wishes of other family members, such as in the case of Samia Imran, who had sought a divorce against the wishes of her
influential father and was killed in April, apparently at the behest of the family (see Section 5).
Press reports routinely describe couples who are less fortunate, such as Abdul Ghaffar and Shabana Bibi of Gila Deedar
Singh, who were abducted from a Gujranwala court on May 15 by 16 armed men representing Shabana Bibi's parents, who
opposed the match. At year's end, the couple's fate was not known.
Upon conversion to Islam, the marriages of Jewish or Christian men remain legal; however, upon conversion to Islam, the
marriages of Jewish or Christian women, or of other non-Muslims, that were performed under the rites of the previous
religion are considered dissolved (see Sections 2.c.).
The Frontier Crimes Regulation, the separate legal system in the FATA, permits collective responsibility, and empowers the
authorities to detain innocent members of the suspect's tribe, or blockade an entire village (see Section 1.d.). The
Government demolished the houses of several alleged criminals, as well as the homes of those who allegedly tolerated
nearby criminal activity.
On December 13, a Shariat court established by the Tehrik-i-Tulaba, an extremist Islamic group in Orakzai Tribal Agency,
fined six alleged accomplices to a killing and burned down their homes as punishment (see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.). On
December 29, riots occurred in Karachi in response to the demolition by security forces of up to 300 homes in the low
income Gharibabad neighborhood, which is widely considered to be an MQM-Altaf stronghold. Authorities claimed that
the homes were built without permits and that they sheltered terrorists and criminals.
In March three young girls who had converted to Islam from Christianity were removed from their parent's custody by a
court (see Section 2.c.). The girls' parents attributed the loss of their girls to the influence of religious extremists who
packed the courtroom, and claim to have suffered harassment because of the case. However, the importance of the parent's
religion in the judge's decision was not clear. The girls' family since has moved, and reportedly is in hiding.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and of the press, and citizens are broadly free to discuss public issues;
however, journalists practice a degree of self-censorship, and the situation with respect to freedom of speech and of the
press deteriorated during the first 10 months of the year, as the Sharif Government attempted to silence several critics, and
to influence directly the substance of media reporting. At year's end, the Musharraf regime had not attempted to exercise
direct control over views expressed in the print media. Nonetheless, views expressed in editorials and commentary are often
frank and pointed in their criticism of the Government. True investigative journalism is rare; instead the press acts freely to
publish charges and countercharges by named and unnamed parties and individuals representing competing class, political,
and social interests.
Anyone who damages the Constitution by any act, including the publication of statements against the spirit of the
Constitution, can be prosecuted for treason. However, prosecutions under this provision have been rare. The Constitution
also prohibits the ridicule of Islam, the armed forces, or the judiciary. This provision served as grounds for the 1997
charges against the presidential candidacy of Rafiq Tarar, based on press statements made several years previously that
were critical of the judiciary. The charges against Tarar later were dismissed.
The Penal Code mandates the death sentence for anyone defiling the name of the Prophet Mohammed, life imprisonment
for desecrating the Koran, and up to 10 years in prison for insulting another's religious beliefs (i.e., any religion, not just
Islam) with intent to outrage religious feelings (see Section 2.c.). The Antiterrorist Act stipulates imprisonment with
rigorous labor for up to 7 years for using abusive or insulting words, or possessing or distributing written or recorded
material, with intent to stir up sectarian hatred. No warrant is required to seize such material (while the Antiterrorist Act was
partially suspended in 1998, the Government promulgated new Antiterrorism Ordinances in October 1998 and in April). In
November two journalists, Zahoor Ansari and Ayub Khoso, were sentenced to 17 years in prison and a fine by an
antiterrorist court; they were sentenced to 10 years under Section 295(a) and 7 years under the Antiterrorist Act. The
journalists, who worked for the Sindhi daily newspaper Alakh, were charged with publishing derogatory words against the
Prophet and insulting the religious feelings of Muslims, according to press reports (see Section 2.c.).
The competitive nature of politics helps to ensure press freedom, since the media often serves as a forum for political
parties, commercial, religious, and various other interests, as well as influential individuals, to compete with and criticize each
other publicly. Although the press does not criticize Islam as such, leaders of religious parties and movements are not
exempt from the public scrutiny and criticism routinely experienced by their secular counterparts. The press traditionally
has avoided negative coverage of the armed forces, and the Office of Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) has served to
hold press coverage of military matters under close restraint. Officially, the ISPR closely controls and coordinates the
release of military news and access to military sources.
Detailed public discussion of the military as an institution is hampered severely since any published discussion, let alone
criticism, of the defense budget is proscribed by law. However, in 1997 this code of silence was undermined when a
National Assembly committee, by discussion of defense appropriations and corruption in defense contracts in open session,
made possible (and legal) newspaper coverage of the same issues. Discussion of the defense budget continued during the
year, especially in the English language press. The resignation of Chief of Army Staff General Jehangir Karamat in
October 1998 also was widely discussed in the press.
Government leaks, while not uncommon, are managed carefully: It is common knowledge that journalists, who routinely are
underpaid, are on the unofficial payrolls of many competing interests, and the military (or elements within it) is presumed to
be no exception. Favorable press coverage in 1998 of the Prime Minister's family compound/hospital/college south of
Lahore was widely understood to have been obtained for a price. Rumors of intimidation, heavy-handed surveillance, and
even legal action to quiet the unduly curious or nondeferential reporter are common. The Government has considerable
leverage over the press through its substantial budget for advertising and public interest campaigns and its control over the
supply of newsprint and its ability to enforce regulations. Human rights groups, journalists, and opposition figures accused
the Government of attempting to silence journalists and public figures, especially when critical of the Prime Minister or his
family. A number of high profile cases of arrest and intimidation of government critics during the year support these
claims. The owners of the Jang newspaper group, which publishes widely read Urdu and English language dailies, and had
published articles unflattering to the Sharif Government, state that the Sharif Government made a number of demands on
the group in 1998. These demands included that Jang fire 16 senior journalists who were critical of the Sharif Government
and replace them with journalists of the Sharif Government's choosing; that Jang publications refrain from publishing
negative articles about the Sharif family; that Jang publications support the adoption of the 15th Amendment; and that Jang
publications adopt a progovernment editorial slant. There is credible evidence that Senator Saifur Rehman, a close associate
of the Prime Minister and head of the Accountability Bureau, demanded that they be fired. The Sharif Government froze
Jang group bank accounts, ceased placing government advertising in Jang newspapers, filed approximately $13 million
(PRs 676 million) in income tax notices with the group, sealed Jang warehouses, severely limited Jang's access to
newsprint, and raided the group's offices in December 1998. The Sharif Government filed sedition charges against Jang
publisher Mir Shakil Ur Rehman. Police again raided Jang premises on January 31, reportedly confiscating newsprint. In
February the Sharif Government suspended its sedition case against Rehman and ceased direct interference with publication
of Jang group newspapers. However, by August, Jang had modified its editorial content, stopped allowing one prominent
journalist to use her own byline, and hired pro-Government journalists. At year's end, the tax charges remain outstanding.
In May a crackdown on the press began. Prominent journalist Najam Sethi, editor of the weekly newspaper Friday Times,
was arrested and detained on May 8 after an April 30 speech in New Delhi in which Sethi highlighted a number of crises
faced by the country; the speech previously was published without incident in the Lahore-based Friday Times newspaper.
Sethi also allegedly had assisted a British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reporting team that was investigating corruption
within the Prime Minister's family. Approximately 30 policemen broke into Sethi's home very early in the morning, beat
him, tied up his wife, destroyed property, and detained Sethi without a warrant. According to press reports, Sethi was
detained and interrogated by Government intelligence services as a suspected "espionage agent." Sethi was held
incommunicado for several days and was denied access to an attorney. On May 13, a plainclothes police detachment seized
over 30,000 copies of the Friday Times, essentially the entire press run for the week. Police produced no warrant or court
order. On May 20, the Supreme Court ordered that Sethi be allowed visits with his wife. On June 1, Sethi was transferred
from the custody of the Inter Services Intelligence Department to police custody. At that time, Sethi was ordered held for 7
days on police remand, pending a hearing by an antiterrorist court magistrate regarding charges of "antinational activities"
filed by a ruling party member of the National Assembly. On June 2, following intense international pressure and strong
criticism from the Pakistani Supreme Court, the Attorney General dropped the charges against Sethi and ordered him
released. Sethi was released the same day. However, Sharif Government pressure on Sethi did not end with his release from
jail. Sethi was called to appear before the Chief Electoral Commission to defend himself against charges made by a ruling
party member of the National Assembly that Sethi's name should be struck from Muslim electoral rolls. The Pakistan
Muslim League legislator argued that Sethi was a non-Muslim as defined by Section 260 (3) of the Constitution, and he
further argued that as a former federal minister, his comments in New Delhi disqualified him for further legislative service
under Sections 62 and 63 of the Constitution. These sections disqualify those who "oppose the ideology of Pakistan" from
serving in the National Assembly or Senate. The case against Sethi was dismissed by the Chief Election Commissioner on
October 6. In June Sethi found that he had been placed on the Exit Control List, and reportedly was not permitted to leave
the country to receive a human rights award in London. According to Sethi, there are also approximately 50 tax cases
currently filed against him and his family.
Other journalists also were targeted, many of whom also had assisted the BBC documentary team that was investigating
corruption within the Sharif family. On May 4, the Intelligence Bureau detained opposition political leader and
commentator Hussain Haqqani. A vocal critic of the Government, Haqqani highlighted wrongdoing by government officials
in his writings, and assisted the BBC documentary team investigating corruption. Haqqani was held by the Intelligence
Bureau between May 4 and May 7, based on corruption charges filed previously. According to Haqqani, his interrogators
demanded to know why he had been critical of the Government and questioned him about the activities of Najam Sethi;
Haqqani was beaten while in custody. Haqqani was transferred to Federal Investigative Agency custody on May 7. On May
10, Haqqani's lawyer was allowed access to his client. Haqqani was released on bail on July 30. The charges are still
pending. The authorities also harassed other journalists involved in the BBC documentary. Idrees Bakhtiar, the BBC's
correspondent in Karachi, was questioned by police and subjected to a warrantless search of his home in February.
Mehmood Ahmed Khan Lodhi, a journalist, was questioned by police authorities from May 2-4 concerning his involvement
in the documentary. Lodhi was released after journalists covering the Punjab provincial assembly boycotted the May 4
assembly session to protest Lodhi's arrest. Imtiaz Alam, current affairs editor of The News, reportedly received threatening
phone calls, including death threats, regarding his contacts with the BBC film crew; on May 5, unknown persons set his car
on fire. Ejaz Haider, news editor at the Friday Times, also reported receiving death threats in early May.
A number of journalists--including Ejaz Haider Bokhari of the Friday Times, Imtiaz Alam of the News, and Dawn
Islamabad bureau chief Mohammed Ziauddin--were subjected to warnings from police or anonymous sources regarding
their criticism of government policies. In March Dawn correspondent M.H. Khan was charged in Hyderabad for a story
that showed photographs of fettered prisoners. Police looking for "objectionable" material raided the Karachi home of
News reporter Gul Nasreen Akhter. In July the news editor of the Sindhi daily Kawish was arrested in Kotri, apparently
after criticism of the police in the press. On July 5, the staff of the magazine Pulse arrived at work to find that the offices
had been broken into and raided by unknown persons, shortly after the magazine had published a series of stories detailing
corruption within the Intelligence Bureau. An editorial in the News noted that reports of Sindhi journalists or editors being
taken into custody "regularly appear" in newspapers. News reporter Moosa Kaleem was detained in August on unspecified
charges. Journalist Maleeha Lodhi in January reported harassment including death threats, phone tapping and threatened
accountability cases because of her position at the Jang publication The News.
Foreign reporters also reported harassment by the Sharif Government during the year, after publication of stories
unflattering to the Sharif family.
The increasing harassment and detention of journalists during the first 10 months of the year led to increasing
self-censorship by members of the press. For example, by August, the Jang group, which had suffered harassment earlier in
the year, acceded to some of the Government's demands regarding its reporting, editorial content, and hiring, including not
publishing stories critical of the Prime Minister and his business interests.
Following the October 12 coup, the Musharraf regime appeared to cease direct efforts to manage the press, which were
common under the Sharif Government. Articles critical of the Musharraf regime appeared regularly in the press. After the
coup, editors and journalists reported no attempts by the ISPR or other government agencies to influence editorial content.
However, some journalists continued to practice self-censorship as a precautionary measure, and the Supreme Court
charged Dawn journalist Ardeshir Cowasjee with contempt of court on October 26 following comments Cowasjee made on
television regarding corruption in the judiciary. The chief legal advisor to General Musharraf, senior National Security
Council member Sharifuddin Pirzada, appeared as a friend of the court on behalf of Cowasjee.
At year's end, the case had not been resolved. During a December 11 protest against the handling of a criminal case in
Lahore, the police beat press photographers and smashed their cameras, after photographers reportedly recognized a
plainclothes policeman, who was hurling bricks into the crowd (see Section 1.c.). The following day, apparently acting on
erroneous information, the Lahore police entered the Lahore Press Club and tried to block all entry and exit points in an
attempt to stop a follow-up demonstration. The demonstration, actually scheduled for December 13, was held without
incident.
The State no longer publishes daily newspapers; the former Press Trust sold or liquidated its string of newspapers and
magazines in the early 1990's. The Ministry of Information controls and manages the country's primary wire service--APP,
the Associated Press of Pakistan. APP is both the Government's own news agency and the official carrier of international
wire service stories to the local media. The few small privately owned wire services usually are circumspect in their coverage
of sensitive domestic news and tend to follow a government line.
A Print, Press, and Publications Ordinance, requiring the registration of printing presses and newspapers, was allowed to
lapse in 1997 after several years of waning application. In practice, registering a new publication is a simple administrative
act, and is not subject to political or government scrutiny.
Foreign books must pass government censors before being reprinted. Books and magazines may be imported freely, but
are likewise subject to censorship for objectionable sexual or religious content. English language publications have not been
affected by the direct proscription of books and magazines promulgated by the Chief Commissioner in Islamabad, who
banned five Sindhi-language publications in the second half of 1997 for "objectionable material against Pakistan," i.e.,
expressions of Sindhi nationalism.
Privately owned newspapers freely discuss public policy and criticize the Government. They report remarks made by
opposition politicians, and their editorials reflect a wide spectrum of views. The effort to ensure that newspapers carry their
statements or press releases sometimes leads to undue pressure by local police, political parties, ethnic, sectarian, and
religious groups, militant student organizations, and occasionally commercial interests. Such pressure is a common feature
of journalism, and, when a group is extreme in its views, can include physical violence, the sacking of offices, the
intimidation or beating of journalists, and interference with the distribution of newspapers. At times landlords and their
agents, who have become accustomed to terrorizing the powerless on their lands in an atmosphere of impunity, also retaliate
against journalists who shed light on their crimes. Journalists working in small provincial towns and villages generally can
expect more difficulties from arbitrary local authorities and influential individuals than their big city counterparts. However,
violence against and intimidation of journalists is a nationwide problem.
The broadcast media are government monopolies. The Government owns and operates the bulk of radio and television
stations through its two official broadcast bureaucracies, the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation and Pakistan Television
(PTV). Domestic news coverage and public affairs programming on these broadcast media are controlled closely by the
Government and traditionally have reflected strongly the views of the party in power. One private radio station, one
television broadcaster, and a semi-private cable television operation have been licensed under special contractual
arrangements with the Government (these were under investigation for possible corruption in making deals, but so far no
irregularities have been found). The semi-private television station, Shalimar Television Network (STN), occasionally has
been closed due to disputes with the Ministry of Information and to financial difficulties. None of these stations is
permitted to produce news and public affairs programming; the private television station rebroadcasts or simulcasts the
regular PTV evening news. The Shalimar Television Network also rebroadcasts PTV news, in addition to current affairs
programming from foreign broadcasters, such as the British Broadcasting Corporation. While the STN routinely censors
those segments considered to be socially or sexually offensive, rarely, if ever, are foreign news stories censored for content.
In July, soon after STN aired news stories critical of the Sha |
